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ABSTRACT 
 
From Team Spirit to Jealousy: 
The Pitfalls of Too Much Transparency∗
 
Free riding in team production arises because individual effort is not perfectly observable. It 
seems natural to suppose that greater transparency would enhance incentives. Therefore, it 
is puzzling that team production often lacks transparency about individual contributions 
despite negligible costs for providing such information. We offer a rationale for this by 
demonstrating that transparency can actually hurt incentives. In the presence of career 
concerns information on the quality of task execution improves incentives while sustaining a 
cooperative team spirit. In contrast, making the identity of individual contributors observable 
induces sabotage behavior that looks like jealousy but arises purely from signal jamming by 
less successful team members. Our results rationalize the conspicuous lack of transparency 
in team settings with strong career concerns (e.g., co-authorship, architecture, and patent 
applications) and contribute to explaining the popularity of group incentive schemes in firms. 
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The authors of [Hindriks and De Donder (2003)] regret that the ’order of authors’
was incorrect in the original article.
Corrigendum reversing the ordering of the authors’ names to create an alphabetical order.
(De Donder and Hindriks 2004)
1 Introduction
It is a common practice in academics to obscure the ranking of individual authors’ overall
contributions to a co-authored paper by listing names in alphabetical order rather than in
order of contribution.1 In fact, virtually all co-authored papers do not even include readily
available measures of specific individual contributions, e.g., in the form of footnotes that
identify the originator of particular ideas among the authors. This is puzzling. It would
seem natural to expect research teams to make use of such information to mitigate the free-
rider problem that arises when individual inputs to the common endeavor are not perfectly
observable (e.g., Holmstro¨m (1982)). Co-authorship2 is just one example for the often observed
lack of transparency about individual contributions in team production despite negligible costs
for providing such additional information. Other domains characterized by powerful career
concerns share this feature: information about individual contributions is often obscured in
professions where creative human capital is prized (e.g., architecture3); partnerships in human
capital intensive professional services (e.g., law firms) avoid publicly observable measures of
individual performance by engaging in profit sharing.4; patent law prevents a public ranking
of individual inventors’ contributions.5
This paper sheds light on this phenomenon. We prove that the relation between transparency
and effort incentives can actually be non-monotonic if the team production is characterized by
1This is especially pervasive in economics, where roughly 85 percent of co-authored papers use alphabetical
listing (Engers, Gans, Grant, and King (1999) and van Praag and van Praag (2003)).
2Our analysis of team production is complementary to Engers, Gans, Grant, and King (1999), who focus
exclusively on the prevalence of alphabetic ordering in co-authorship.
3 ”Architecture is a profession in which design capability is prized and intellectual property is the most
common proof of worth, in terms of talent and of experience. It is the nature of contemporary practice to be
a collaborative team effort.” (AIA (2004)). Nevertheless, architecture firms often do not disclose individuals’
contributions to projects (e.g., OAA (2000)).
4Profit sharing is the norm in law firms (e.g., Gilson and Mnookin (1985)) and these are also concerned with
assuring ”[...] that the client’s perception of quality is associated with the firm rather than with one or a small
number of lawyers.” (Gilson and Mnookin (1985) p.362).
5In joint patent applications, by legal design, the order of the inventors’ names has no significance (e.g.,
Eisenberg (2000)).
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strong career concerns and if team members have the ability to adversely affect joint produc-
tion. These two ingredients are nicely captured by the co-authorship example. Publication of
a co-authored paper typically results in no or only small immediate pecuniary gains whereas
the impact on future salaries can be substantial.6 Clearly, the success of a paper depends
not only on each co-author’s individual effort but also on the team members’ willingness to
cooperate.
In the first part of the paper we analyze such self-governed teams. We show that some
transparency enhances members’ effort incentives without affecting the cooperative team spirit.
The additional information alleviates the free rider problem by aligning an individual’s share
of direct material gains more closely with her contribution. However, since team production
reveals information about its members’ productive abilities, each individual’s contribution
affects her (and the team mates’) future compensation in the labor market (reputation). If
there is too much transparency about the production process (in a sense made more precise
below), team members will try to influence their reputation by engaging in behavior that
adversely affects the overall team performance. Such sabotage behavior looks like jealousy but
arises purely from signal jamming by less successful team members.
The second part of the paper looks beyond self-governed teams to team incentives in firms.
It is often argued that incentive contracts based on individual performance reduce worker
morale and create conflict in teams. We demonstrate that indeed group incentives can be
strictly more profitable than individual incentives because they lower the cost for the principal
of inducing cooperation among team members. Thus, the possibility of information-induced
sabotage that we highlight offers an additional rationale for the increasing popularity of low-
powered group incentives in firms (e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw (2003)). In contrast to the
existing literature, in our model sabotage is not a direct consequence of perceived inequalities
in pay (e.g., Levine (1991) and Clark and Oswald (1996)) or of competition induced by relative
performance evaluation or implicit tournaments (e.g., Lazear (1989) and Chen (2003)) but
rather due to the informational externality that an agent can impose on the team.
Our basic argument can be summarized as follows. Consider two individuals working on a
6Estimates of expected salary increases in economics departments range from between 1.3 and 1.9 percent
(Baser and Pema 2001) to 3.8 percent (Sauer (1988) who includes returns to citations) for ten article pages
in the American Economic Review (AER) or 10.3 percent per AER-equivalent article (Ragan, Warren, and
Bratsberg 1999). The first top finance journal publication has been estimated to have a present value of $ 20-
30,000 (Swidler and Goldreyer 1998). In contrast to Sauer (1988) the study of Moore, Newman, and Turnbull
(2001) suggests that economics departments do not appear to discount multi-authored papers. They report an
impact of roughly 3 percent of a publication in one of the ten leading journals.
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joint project for which the success probability depends on the kind of contribution that each
team member provides in her task. There is a routine method that all types of players can
apply. However, if an individual is talented and exerts effort, she can discover a novel approach
to her task that –appropriately implemented– increases the project’s success probability. A
prerequisite for implementing such a novel method is coordination with the team mate. If a
team member refuses to cooperate with her colleague (implicit sabotage) the novel method
cannot be applied, and the team has to revert to the routine method. An incentive problem
arises because effort to develop innovative approaches is unobservable and costly for team
members.
We first consider a situation in which there are no direct material benefits from the project
outcome and only the impact of team members’ actions on their future compensation in the
labor market matter. Our co-authorship example fits roughly into this category. Suppose that
the market observes only whether a project has succeeded or failed. Then, success is a stronger
signal about the presence of a talented individual in the team than lack of success: talented
individuals may discover a novel approach that increases the project’s success probability.
All team members share the same reputation because market inference is based only on the
project outcome. On the one hand, this leads to free riding on the team mate’s effort, which
is detrimental to incentives. On the other hand, no team member ever wants to engage
in sabotage because this would only reduce the own expected reputation by lowering the
probability of success.
Increasing transparency so that team members’ contributions can be observed anonymously
enhances incentives because the reputational impact of effort for a talented worker becomes
stronger: the implementation of a novel approach now is directly visible and thus increases
the team members’ reputations even in the absence of success. As before, reputation is the
same for all team members and no sabotage occurs. Free riding remains an issue because an
individual who fails to come up with new ideas benefits from a team mate’s innovation and
the ensuing increase in the team’s collective reputation.
In principle, free riding could be mitigated by increasing transparency further to make ob-
servable the specific contribution of each team member. Absent sabotage, if an individual
discovers a novel method she is thereby identified as the source of the innovation and cap-
tures the full reputational credit instead of being put in the same pot with her –possibly less
successful– team mate. However, failure to develop a new method can now be attributed
as well. Therefore an unsuccessful individual has an incentive to sabotage her team mate.
Specifically, if the market observes a team profile of routine approaches this might stem from
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failure of both team members to innovate or from one team member with a novel idea (who
therefore must be talented) being prevented from implementing it. In contrast, being the
sole unsuccessful contributor to the project sends a stronger negative message about talent:
the possibility of sabotage can no longer serve as an excuse for failing to come up with new
ideas. Thus, sabotage provides an unsuccessful team member with an opportunity to create
a smokescreen of collective failure behind which to hide her individual failure. Because the
market cannot distinguish her from her potentially more successful and able colleague, hiding
behind this smokescreen enhances the reputation of the saboteur.
Sabotage looks like jealousy-inspired behavior because it occurs unless all team members suc-
cessfully innovate. Since it weakens the incentives for talented individuals to exert effort in
the first place, a non-monotonic relation between transparency and effort incentives arises.
Transparency about the team’s production process alleviates the free rider problem as long
as reputation is not individually attributable. Increasing transparency further to create indi-
vidual accountability induces sabotage behavior aimed at jamming the signal that the market
receives about the saboteur. A team member can prevent the market from observing unfa-
vorable information about her ability by undermining the team mate’s contribution since this
creates a correlation among bad performance signals that renders them less informative about
each individual. This provides a rationale for restricting the degree of transparency on the
identity of contributors in team production.
In our model, sabotage equilibria continue to exist even if there are direct material benefits
from joint production. An example for such a setting where career concerns and material
benefits both play important roles are teams of architects submitting proposals to a project
competition.7 Even though cooperative equilibria may also arise in such an environment, we
show in an extension that these are not robust to slight changes in the information structure.
As soon as there is a small probability that cooperation cannot only break down because of
sabotage but also due to some exogenous event, e.g., team members do not ’get along’, the
presence of material benefits is not sufficient to prevent sabotage.
In several extensions of the base model we demonstrate that our main insights are robust to
modelling choices. In particular, they are reinforced if the quality of contributions can only be
observed in case of project success (as seems likely in our co-authorship example) or if team
members start with different prior reputations. Moreover, we provide a detailed analysis of
the welfare implications of enhanced transparency in team production.
7See footnote 3.
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Related literature
Our work contributes to the literature on incentives in teams originated by Holmstro¨m (1982)’s
seminal paper. As shown there, free riding cannot be entirely overcome if rewards from the
common enterprise are fully shared among team members. In the presence of career concerns
this problem persists (Jeon 1996). A natural conjecture is that greater transparency about
team members’ specific performances is a way out of this problem. Our results show that this
intuition is wrong when there are career concerns and team members can affect each other’s
performances.
Our analysis of a principal - team of agents setting in the second part of the paper adds to
a recent theoretical literature on group incentives (e.g., Itoh (1991) and Che and Yoo (2001))
and is most related to Auriol, Friebel, and Pechlivanos (2002). They derive optimal linear
incentive schemes for teams under repeated interaction with a principal who has imperfect
commitment power. In their model helping others enhances the perceived ability of all team
members and leads to an increase in the collective component in the compensation scheme. A
ratchet effect arises because of lacking commitment power by the principal. One implication
of their analysis is that career concerns reduce cooperation only if the same agents remain
teamed up during their productive life.8 In contrast, in our setup sabotage arises even though
there is no future interaction between team mates.
Our findings also contribute to the literature on conditions under which more information can
hurt principals. Remaining ignorant about agents’ abilities can serve as a commitment device
to fire able agents who shirk (Cre´mer 1995). In the context of Holmstro¨m (1999)’s model of
career concerns for individuals, Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) show that reputational
incentives can increase as the signal structure becomes coarser. Similar results obtain when
explicit incentives interact with career concerns (Koch and Peyrache (2003, 2005)) or with
ratchet effects (Meyer and Vickers 1997). In a model of expert career concerns, Prat (2005)
shows that the incentive effects of transparency on consequences of actions can be very different
from those of information on the actions themselves. Our model comes to a similar conclusion
in the context of teams.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the base model. Section 3 studies
the case of pure career concerns. The interaction of career concerns and material benefits is
analyzed in Section 4. Welfare implications of transparency are the focus of Sections 5 and 6.
Section 7 studies the design of team compensation contracts by a principal. Section 8 presents
8When an agent leaves the firm or joins a different team, her future team mates’ reputation and thus the
collective pay component is not affected by help provided to current team mates.
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several other extensions of the base model. Section 9 concludes.
2 Base model
Our setup considers two workers i = 1, 2 who join to form a team when they are young
(period 1) and then move on to a competitive market for experienced labor where they pursue
individual careers (period 2). Their outside options are normalized to zero. A worker can
either be of ’ordinary’ ability (θi = θ) or ’talented’ (θi = θ¯), with Pr(θ = θ¯) = λ ≤ 12 .9
Workers are wealth and credit constrained, risk neutral, and maximize their life-time income.
For simplicity, the discount factor is normalized to one, and the initial wealth of each worker
is normalized to zero.
Team production in period 1
Prior to learning about their work-related ability, both workers form a team to contribute to a
project that can succeed or fail: y˜ ∈ {0, 1}. The payoff of the project is zero in case of failure
and pi in case of success, i.e., it is given by y˜ pi. The production technology requires both
team mates to perform specific tasks which are complex, and therefore make it impossible for
an individual to do all of them alone. Hence, each worker in the team is assigned one task.
Each of these tasks can be implemented by taking one of two approaches: a standard –routine–
method (R) or an innovative –novel– method (N). Any worker is capable of taking the routine
approach to her respective task. However, the novel method requires the development of new
ideas which only talented workers are able to come up with. After learning their own type
but not that of the colleague,10 agents can engage in effort e ∈ {0, 1} to develop ideas at unit
cost c. If a talented worker exerts effort in generating ideas she discovers a novel approach
(Ii = 1) with probability η. With probability (1− η), she has no innovative ideas (Ii = 0) and
can only take the routine action. Absent effort or talent, workers never succeed in discovering
innovative strategies, and are therefore restricted to execute their tasks according to routine
practice:
Pr(Ii = 1 | ei = 1, θ¯) = η, (1)
Pr(Ii = 1 | ei = 0, θ¯) = 0, (2)
Pr(Ii = 1 | ei = 0, θ) = Pr(Ii = 1 | ei = 1, θ) = 0. (3)
9That is, talent is relatively scarce. This restriction simplifies the exposition but does not affect the existence
of the types of equilibria presented below.
10This simplifying assumption of asymmetric learning is dropped in Section 6.
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As a convenient short hand, denote the ex ante probability of a worker who exerts effort to
discover a novel approach as Λ ≡ λ η. A worker can choose what approach she intends to
implement from the set of available approaches: her intended approach is
Ai ∈
 {R} if Ii = 0,{R,N} if Ii = 1. (4)
However, the realized contribution to a task may differ from that intended by a worker be-
cause implementing new ideas requires the team mate’s cooperation. The team mates’ tasks
are interdependent and require some coordination to fit together. Absent collaboration on
implementing ideas (sabotage), innovations cannot be put to productive use and workers are
forced to implement the routine approach. We represent this interaction by a simple simulta-
neous choice of intended approaches Ai (in the action set determined by Ii) and a decision of
whether to sabotage or not the team mate, Si ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, 2.11 The profile of realized
approaches (Aˆ1, Aˆ2) is given by
(Aˆ1, Aˆ2) =
 (A1, A2) if S1 = S2 = 0,(R,R) otherwise. (5)
For simplicity, we assume that players who are indifferent about whether to cooperate or not
choose sabotage. Alternatively, we could introduce an arbitrarily small cost of coordination
with the team mate.
Success depends on the quality of realized contributions and is most likely if both workers
implement a novel approach and the least likely if both implement a routine approach:
Pr(y˜ = 1 | Aˆ1, Aˆ2) =

pNN if
(
Aˆ1 = N, Aˆ2 = N
)
,
pN if
(
Aˆ1 = N, Aˆ2 = R
)
or
(
Aˆ1 = R, Aˆ2 = N
)
,
p if
(
Aˆ1 = R, Aˆ2 = R
)
,
(6)
where pNN > pN > p.
Labor market for experienced workers in period 2
In period 2, both workers enter a competitive labor market for experienced workers. The value
of an experienced ’ordinary’ worker’s labor services is assumed to be k > 0 and that of an
11For simplicity, we assume here that only the outcome of the own idea generating process is learned. Our
qualitative results obtain also under the following alternative modelling choices: 1. Workers can condition their
decision to sabotage or not on the set of both worker’s ideas. 2. Worker i can confine sabotage to player j’s
intended novel approach.
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experienced ’talented’ worker k¯ = k+∆ k, ∆ k > 0. Risk neutral firms compete in wage offers
a` la Bertrand for the services of a worker.12
Firms cannot observe workers’ types or effort decisions directly. However, they can observe
some aspects of the team production process. We compare three information regimes that
reflect different degrees of transparency about the production process, R ∈ {PR, TR, IR}:
1. Performance Record (PR). This is the regime with the least transparency. The
labor market only observes the project’s outcome: y˜ ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Team Record (TR). Under this regime, the labor market can observe both team
output and the quality of realized approaches without learning which approach a specific
team member implemented. That is, firms observe an anonymous profile
(
Aˆ, Aˆ; y˜
)
.
3. Individual Records (IR). This is the regime with the greatest transparency. The
labor market observes team output and who realized a specific approach in the production
process:
(
Aˆ1, Aˆ2; y˜
)
.
Contracts
In the beginning of period 1, the workers meet and can agree to form a team and what
contract to write to govern this relationship. We assume that bargaining power is symmetric.
As is standard in career concerns models, team members are restricted to spot contracts that
condition transfers among each other only on publicly observable variables and that respect
limited liability. That is, the first period outcomes that can be contracted upon depend on
the information regime R ∈ {PR, TR, IR}, and transfers cannot condition on outcomes in the
second period.
In period 2, firms can condition wages on any information about the first period that is
available to them. The contract between the team members and the distributed profit shares
are not part of this information set.13 Due to its competitive nature, the labor market for
experienced workers leads to wage offers equal to a worker’s expected productivity, conditional
on observable variables under the information regime R. Denote this market information by
12This is a simple way of formalizing the idea that a worker’s second period utility is increasing in expected
ability. Section 6 provides an alternative interpretation in terms of sorting into different jobs in the second
period.
13One reason for this modelling choice is that such agreements are typically secret in real life. Another is
theoretical: it precludes the possibility of using contract terms as signals about the strategies that workers play.
Such a model would not add much in terms of economic insight regarding the issue of transparency that we are
interested in.
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m(R) ∈ M(R), then the equilibrium market wage is equal to the belief about worker i’s
productivity:
bi (m(R)) = k + Pr
(
θi = θ¯ |m(R)
)
∆ k. (7)
Because of limited liability, first period contracts between the team members take a particularly
simple form: they consist of a sharing rule α : M(R) → [0, 1], fixing the share of first period
profits y˜ pi accruing to worker 1.14 To conclude the description of the model, we summarize
the sequence of events:
Period 1
1. Nature determines θi ∈ {θ, θ¯} where Pr(θi = θ¯) = λ for i = 1, 2.
2. Both workers decide on forming a team and on a contract to govern the team relationship.
3. Each worker observes her own ability θi, i = 1, 2.
4. Each worker chooses effort ei ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2.
5. Nature determines the quality of ideas Ii ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2.
6. Each worker chooses an intended approach
Ai ∈
 {R} if Ii = 0,{R,N} if Ii = 1, and makes a sabotage decision Si ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2.
7. The profile of realized approaches is determined:
(Aˆ1, Aˆ2) =
 (A1, A2) if S1 = S2 = 0,(R,R) otherwise.
8. Nature determines project success y˜ ∈ {0, 1} and contract payoffs are realized.
Period 2
1. Firms observe information m(R) and can make a wage offer to each worker.
2. Workers choose which offer, if any, to accept.
3. Payoffs are realized.
14 Note that this assumes that there is no free disposal. It appears natural that the team members cannot
commit to giving up part of the joint profit. Indeed, then they would always have an incentive to renegotiate
the contract ex post to split up the part that was not supposed to be distributed under the original contract.
This is similar to the setup in Holmstro¨m (1982).
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3 Career concerns and accountability
In our benchmark case, there are no direct material benefits from a successful project, i.e.,
pi = 0. Due to the restriction to spot contracts and because of limited liability this excludes
(non-trivial) contingent contracts in period 1, and incentives for effort can only arise from the
impact of the first period outcome on the second period wages.15
Strategies and solution concept
A strategy for a worker contains a decision of whether to team up with the other player or not,
an effort decision e : {θ, θ¯} → {0, 1}, a choice of intended approach to her task16 Ai : {0, 1} →
{R,N}, and a decision whether or not to engage in sabotage Si : {θ, θ¯}×{0, 1} → {0, 1}. The
second period labor market is represented through a belief mapping b : M(R) → [k, k¯]. To
analyze team production and effort incentives under the different information regimes, we use
the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Team formation and team equilibria
Prior to learning their types both workers meet and decide on forming a team. Our focus is
only on ’team equilibria’, where players always join forces. The following lemma provides a
sufficient condition for workers’ individual rationality constraints to be satisfied at the team
formation stage:
Lemma 1
Both workers’ individual rationality constraints are satisfied at the team formation stage if
k + λ (∆ k − c) ≥ 0. (8)
Proof.
At the team formation stage information is symmetric. Equilibrium beliefs are a martingale and second
period wages are equal to expected talent conditional on market information m(R). Thus, given that
there are no direct material benefits from team output, a team member’s expected second period wage
is equal to k+λ∆ k. Effort costs are at most c and can only incur if a worker is talented, which happens
with probability λ. Combined with the value zero of the outside option of not belonging to a team, the
result obtains.
15This corresponds to a pure career concerns setting (e.g., Holmstro¨m (1999) and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and
Tirole (1999)).
16Without loss of generality, the dependence on the type θ is dropped because the action set depends only
on the set of available ideas Ii.
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In the following, we assume that the parameters satisfy condition (8) so that team formation
is always part of an equilibrium. We further confine our analysis to the most interesting case
of ’high effort equilibria’, in which talented agents always exert effort. Since no worker would
engage in futile effort or sabotage herself, in any candidate equilibrium where effort is exerted
(ei(θ¯) = 1) novel approaches are always implemented (Ai(Ii = 1) = N) and a successful
innovator does not engage in sabotage (Si(·, 1) = 0).
3.1 Performance Record
Under the Performance Record (PR) regime, firms in the second period labor market only
learn whether the team’s project in period 1 was successful or not: m(PR) = y˜ ∈ {0, 1}. Since
y˜ does not contain any information about what approaches a particular worker implemented,
the market’s beliefs about both workers’ abilities are identical. Consider now the candidate
equilibrium in which agents always exert effort and workers never engage in sabotage, with
the corresponding market beliefs. Straightforward but tedious calculations show that second
period wages following success are
b(1) = Pr(θ¯, θ¯ | 1) k¯ + Pr(θ, θ | 1) k + Pr(θ, θ¯ | 1) k + k¯
2
= k +
NUM
Pr(1)
∆ k, (9)
where
NUM ≡ Λ [Λ pNN + (1− Λ) pN ] + λ [Λ pN + (1− Λ) p ] , (10)
and the unconditional success probability is given by
Pr(1) = Λ2 pNN + 2Λ(1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p. (11)
Similarly, second period wages following failure are
b(0) = k +
λ−NUM
1− Pr(1) ∆ k. (12)
Given the other team mate’s equilibrium strategy and the market beliefs, it never pays off for a
worker to deviate from the candidate equilibrium strategy and engage in sabotage. The second
period wage is larger following success than following failure: b(1) > b(0). Hence, engaging in
sabotage, a worker i would strictly reduce the success probability:17 team mate j discovers a
novel idea with probability Λ, and thus sabotage would reduce the success probability from
Λ pNN + (1 − Λ) pN to p (if I = 1 and worker i could implement a novel approach) or from
Λ pN + (1− Λ) p to p (if I = 0 and worker i implements a routine approach).
17This is also true if the market beliefs are that sabotage occurs whenever a worker fails to generate novel
ideas, preventing the existence of a high-effort sabotage equilibrium.
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What remains to be determined are the conditions under which both workers indeed exert
effort if they are talented. The incentive constraint for a talented worker i is given by
−c+ {η [Λ pNN + (1− Λ) pN ] + (1− η) [Λ pN + (1− Λ) p] } b(1)
+ {η [Λ (1− pNN ) + (1− Λ) (1− pN )] + (1− η) [Λ (1− pN ) + (1− Λ) (1− p)] } b(0)
≥ {Λ pN + (1− Λ) p} b(1) + {Λ (1− pN ) + (1− Λ) (1− p)} b(0)
⇔ cPR0 ≡ ηΛ (1−λ) [Λ (pNN−pN )+(1−Λ) (pN−p)]
2
Pr(1) (1−Pr(1)) ∆ k ≥ c. (13)
This leads to the following result.
Lemma 2
Under information regime PR, all high-effort equilibria involve no sabotage. Such a high-effort
equilibrium e1(θ¯) = e2(θ¯) = 1; S1(·, ·) = S2(·, ·) = 0 exists whenever
c ≤ cPR0 ≡
ηΛ (1− λ) [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p)]2
Pr(1) (1− Pr(1)) ∆ k,
Pr(1) = Λ2 pNN + 2Λ(1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p.
3.2 Team Record
Under the Team Record (TR) regime, firms in the second period labor market observe the
team’s performance y˜ ∈ {0, 1} and what types of approaches were used in the production
process. However, outsiders cannot distinguish which team member made a specific contri-
bution. The additional information comes in the form of an anonymous profile of realized
approaches (Aˆ, Aˆ) ∈ {N,R}2, where anonymity is expressed by the lack of indices. Ability
and effort affect success or failure of the project only by determining the approaches available
to the team. Therefore, on the equilibrium path, the profile of realized approaches (Aˆ, Aˆ) is a
sufficient statistic for m(TR) = (Aˆ, Aˆ; y˜) with respect to workers’ abilities.
Again, we consider candidate equilibria in which talented agents exert effort and there is no
sabotage. Upon observing team production and outcomes, firms pay the following second
period wages
b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) = k¯ (14)
b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) = k +
[
Pr(θ¯, θ¯ | Rˆ, Nˆ) + Pr(θ, θ¯ | Rˆ, Nˆ)
2
]
∆ k = k +
1
2
[
1 +
λ− Λ
1− Λ
]
∆ k, (15)
b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·) = k +
[
Pr(θ¯, θ¯ | Rˆ, Rˆ) + Pr(θ, θ¯ | Rˆ, Rˆ)
2
]
∆ k = k +
λ− Λ
1− Λ ∆ k. (16)
As under the PR-regime, given the other players’ equilibrium strategies and beliefs, it never
pays off for a worker to deviate from the candidate equilibrium strategy and to engage in
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sabotage. After all, the second period wage is identical for both workers and increases whenever
any of the workers realizes a novel approach instead of a routine one.
The incentive constraint for a talented worker i is given by
−c+ η
[
Λ b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) + (1− Λ) b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·)
]
+ (1− η)
[
Λ b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) + (1− Λ) b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)
]
≥ Λ b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) + (1− Λ) b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)
⇔ cTR0 ≡ η (1−λ)2 (1−Λ) ∆ k ≥ c. (17)
Again, it can be shown that high-effort sabotage equilibria cannot exist (see appendix), leading
to the following result.
Lemma 3
Under information regime TR, all high-effort equilibria involve no sabotage. Such a high-effort
equilibrium e1(θ¯) = e2(θ¯) = 1; S1(·, ·) = S2(·, ·) = 0 exists whenever
c ≤ cTR0 ≡
η (1− λ)
2 (1− Λ) ∆ k.
3.3 Individual Records
Under the Individual Records (IR) regime, firms in the second period labor market observe the
realization of y˜ and the different realized approaches are fully attributable to individual team
members: (Aˆ1, Aˆ2) ∈ {R,N}2. The transparency on individual contributions allows firms to
form separate judgements of each individual worker. However, the lack of symmetry in beliefs
(and consequently in payoffs) across team mates has a serious downside: cooperation cannot
be part of an equilibrium. Suppose that the market forms beliefs under the presumption that
sabotage never occurs. Then, a worker i who fails to come up with an innovative idea is
indifferent between cooperation or sabotage since bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) = bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·). Therefore, given
our tie-breaking assumption/the cost of coordination, in equilibrium a player i will always
choose to sabotage the team mate if she herself lacks the capability to implement a novel
approach.18
Taking this into consideration leads to the following equilibrium beliefs. On the equilibrium
path only homogeneous profiles of realized approaches are observed: (Nˆ1, Nˆ2) or (Rˆ1, Rˆ2). If a
realized novel approach is observed for a worker i, this reveals her talent (given the candidate
equilibrium strategies, this occurs if and only if Ii = Ij = 1):
bi(Nˆi, ·; ·) = k¯, i = 1, 2. (18)
18Our result obtains without this indifference assumption whenever there are exogenous sources of conflict or
contributions are only observable in case of success y˜ = 1 (see Section 8).
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If both workers fail to implement a novel approach, given the candidate equilibrium strategies,
each worker might be of average ability (I), talented and unlucky in the search for innovative
ideas (II), or talented and stopped from realizing a novel approach by sabotage (III):
Pr(Rˆi) = 1− Pr(Ii = Ij = 1) = 1− λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+λ (1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
+Λ(1− Λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III)
= 1− Λ2. (19)
This leads to the second period wage
bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) = k + λ− Λ
2
1− Λ2 ∆ k. (20)
A deviation by worker i to a cooperative strategy with Si(·, ·) = 0 would lead to the off the
equilibrium path profile of realized approaches (Rˆi, Nˆj) with some probability. Upon observing
realized approaches (Rˆi, Nˆj), it is clear that worker j is talented and exerted effort. The worst
belief about worker i that is consistent with the technology is constructed as follows: the
worker is assumed to have provided effort if she was talented and not to have been stopped
from implementing a potentially discovered novel approach by sabotage. Then, not observing
a novel approach for worker i is a bad signal and her expected ability is
bmini (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) = k +
λ− Λ
1− Λ ∆ k. (21)
The best possible belief arises if the market assumes that she exerted no effort:
bmaxi (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) = k + λ∆ k. (22)
Hence, consistent beliefs lead to second period wages
bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) ∈
[
bmini (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·), bmaxi (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·)
]
. (23)
Since bmaxi (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) > bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·), the equilibrium exists if and only if off the equilibrium
path beliefs satisfy the following condition19
bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) ∈
[
bmini (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·), bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·)
]
. (24)
Given equilibrium beliefs that satisfy condition (24), the effort incentive constraint for a tal-
ented worker i is given by
ηΛ bi(Nˆi, ·; ·) + (1− ηΛ) bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·)− c ≥ bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·),
⇔ cIR0 ≡ ηΛ−Λ
2
1−Λ2 ∆ k ≥ c. (25)
This leads to the following result.
19Note, an arbitrarily small error probability in the sabotage decision suffices to put bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) =
bmini (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) on the equilibrium path.
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Lemma 4
Under information regime IR, all high-effort equilibria involve sabotage. Such a high-effort
equilibrium e1(θ¯) = e2(θ¯) = 1; Si(·, 0) = 1, Si(·, 1) = 0, i = 1, 2 exists if and only if beliefs
satisfy condition (24) and
c ≤ cIR0 ≡
ηΛ− Λ2
1− Λ2 ∆ k.
3.4 Comparison of information regimes
A comparison of the thresholds from Lemmas 2- 4 (see appendix) yields the following result:
Proposition 1
The range of parameter values for which a high-effort equilibrium exists is non-monotonic in
the degree of transparency:
cTR0 > c
PR
0 and c
TR
0 > c
IR
0 .
High-effort equilibria under information regimes PR and TR are always cooperative. All high-
effort equilibria under the IR-regime involve sabotage.
Moving from the PR-regime to the more transparent TR-regime increases the range of effort
cost values for which a high-effort equilibrium exists. Moreover, in these equilibria sabotage
does not occur and all innovations in the team are actually realized. Effort incentives under
the TR-regime improve because the visibility of the team’s realized approaches makes more
finely tuned market beliefs possible. By exerting effort and implementing innovative ideas,
talented players can increase the market’s belief about the team members’ average ability.
Because the market only has access to anonymous information a cooperative team spirit is
preserved: both team mates benefit from innovations and refrain from sabotage.
In spite of the additional incentives, the TR-regime still suffers from free riding among the
team mates: because performance information is anonymous, the reputational benefits from
exerting effort to discover a novel approach are shared across the team and do not fully accrue
to the innovator.
The PR- and TR-regimes suffer from free riding: the reputational benefits from exerting
effort to discover a novel approach are shared across the team and do not fully accrue to the
innovator. Thus, the individual accountability under the IR-regime could potentially boost
incentives so that high-effort equilibria arise for an even greater range of cost parameters:
each worker could then reap all the reputational benefits from realizing a novel approach
instead of only getting a reputation premium that is lower because of the ’averaging’ over the
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team members’ reputations under the PR- and TR-regimes. However, as a consequence of
the individual accountability induced by the IR-regime, players no longer care about their
team mate’s achievements. This undermines cooperation and leads to behavior that looks
like jealousy since team members engage in sabotage if they themselves fail to produce an
innovation.
The possibility of sabotage provides a player with the means to jam the signal on her ability
that her failure to realize an innovative approach sends to the market. To see how this
smokescreen works, suppose that sabotage was not possible. In this case, it reflects badly on
a worker if she is only able to realize a routine approach. The market’s judgement is that she
is either talented and failed to discover new ideas (I) or untalented (II):
bNSi (Rˆi, ·; ·) = k +
(I)︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ− Λ
1− Λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)+(II)
∆ k. (26)
The opportunity to engage in sabotage, changes this picture: a worker i who fails to realize a
novel approach is thought to be either talented and to have failed to discover new ideas (I), to
be untalented (II), or to be talented and to have been stopped from realizing a novel approach
by sabotage (III):
bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) = k +
(I)+(II)︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ− Λ2
1− Λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)+(II)+(III)
∆ k. (27)
Since bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) > bNSi (Rˆi, ·; ·), sabotage provides a way of jamming the performance signal
that the market receives – effectively hiding behind a smokescreen of common failure – so that
individual failure to innovate does not look as bad as it would if team mates always cooperated.
Due to these sabotage activities, the additional transparency under the IR-regime actually
reduces overall incentives compared to the TR-regime.
The comparison between information regimes PR and IR is less clear cut. If a high-effort
equilibrium exists under both regimes, then innovations are always realized under PR while
some innovations fall prey to sabotage under IR. However, the threshold value cPR0 may be
either larger or smaller than cIR0 , depending on the values of p, pN , and pNN , i.e., on how
informative y˜ = y is about the use of innovative approaches. For example, consider the case
in which y˜ = y is an extremely powerful signal for innovative ideas: pNN , pN → 1 and p→ 0.
Then, cPR0 − cIR0 converges to the following expression:
η (1− λ)
2 (1− Λ) −
ηΛ (1− λ)
1− Λη =
η (1− λ)
2 (1 + Λ)
∆ k > 0. (28)
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In this case cTR0 > c
PR
0 > c
IR
0 .
4 The case of material benefits
In this section, we introduce direct monetary gains from successful project outcomes (pi > 0),
the distribution of which team members can regulate in a contract. Such a contingent sharing
rule can be used to influence (i) the division of surplus ex ante;20 (ii) effort incentives at the
idea generating stage; and (iii) cooperation/sabotage at the production stage.
4.1 Performance Record
If talented workers exert effort and there is no sabotage, firms’ beliefs are as in Section 3.1.
Sabotage cannot be part of a such an equilibrium since the market has identical beliefs about
both workers’ abilities. Both current period profits and second period wages following success
are strictly larger than those following failure. Thus, direct material benefits and contracts
only influence the conditions under which a high-effort equilibrium exists. Given the symmetry
in beliefs, a contract with equal profit shares, α(·) = 1/2, maximizes both workers’ effort
incentives and thus the range of equilibria. The only difference to the incentive constraint in
Section 3.1 is that in case of a successful project outcome each team member earns pi/2 in
addition to the second period wage equal to b(1). Since there are direct material benefits from
team production, a forteriori condition (8) guarantees that players form a team. The remaining
step is to show that at the team formation/contracting stage (before learning their own type)
team members, given the above market beliefs, prefer to write a contract that satisfies both
workers’ incentive constraints instead of setting other contract terms (see appendix). This
leads to the following result:
Lemma 5
With material benefit pi, under information regime PR, all high-effort equilibria involve no
sabotage. Such a high-effort equilibrium e1(θ¯) = e2(θ¯) = 1; S1(·, ·) = S2(·, ·) = 0 exists if and
only if
c ≤ cPR+ ≡ η [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p)] pi/2 + cPR0 .
Not surprisingly, reputational incentives are not affected by direct payoffs from a successful
project. The material incentives simply add on to reputational incentives.
20Our assumption of symmetric bargaining power implies that the contract has to maximize ex ante expected
team surplus.
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4.2 Team Record
As under the PR-regime, material benefits and contracts only influence the conditions under
which a high-effort equilibrium exists.
Lemma 6
With material benefit pi, under information regime PR, all high-effort equilibria involve no
sabotage. Such a high-effort equilibrium e1(θ¯) = e2(θ¯) = 1; S1(·, ·) = S2(·, ·) = 0 exists if and
only if
c ≤ cTR+ ≡ η [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p)] pi/2 + cTR0 .
4.3 Individual Records
Direct material benefits and contracts have the biggest impact on the conditions under which
high-effort equilibria exist under the IR-regime: as a consequence of these benefits high-effort
equilibria with and without sabotage can arise.
High-effort equilibria with sabotage
Candidate equilibrium.
Suppose that the market believes that talented agents exert effort and workers without
an innovation engage in sabotage. Then, as in Section 3.3 bi(Nˆi, ·; ·) = k¯, i = 1, 2 and
bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) = k + λ−Λ21−Λ2 ∆ k.
Before checking that team mates have no incentive to deviate from S(·, 0) = 1 to S(·, 0) = 0,
we write down the incentive constraint for worker 1 given the candidate equilibrium strategies,
ηΛ
[
α(Nˆ1, Nˆ2; 1) pNN − α(Rˆ1, Rˆ2; 1) p
]
pi + cIR0 ≥ c. (29)
Similarly, the incentive constraint for worker 2 is
ηΛ
[
(1− α(Nˆ1, Nˆ2; 1)) pNN − (1− α(Rˆ1, Rˆ2; 1)) p
]
pi + cIR0 ≥ c. (30)
Thus, a necessary condition for the existence of a sabotage equilibrium is that contract terms
α(Nˆ1, Nˆ2; 1) and α(Rˆ1, Rˆ2; 1) as well as cost parameter c satisfy inequalities (29) and (30). It
remains to be shown under which conditions team mates do not deviate to cooperation.
Conditions for no profitable deviation to cooperation.
A deviation by worker i, who failed to innovate, to cooperation now impacts both her expected
second period wage and her expected share of team profits under the team’s contract. Given
the other player’s equilibrium strategy, cooperation moves her expected second period wage
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from bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) to Λ bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) + (1−Λ) bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·). Thus, the maximum expected loss in
terms of reputation from such a deviation is
Λ
[
b(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·)− bmini (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·)
]
=
Λ2 (1− λ)
1− Λ2 ∆ k, (31)
where bmini (Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) is the worst consistent belief about worker i (see equation (21)).
Contracts can be designed to help induce cooperation at the interim stage by allocating a
larger share of the material benefit to a team member who is the only one to have failed to
innovate. Without loss of generality, deviation to cooperation for a player who did not innovate
can be induced at the interim stage 2 if there exists an α(Rˆ1, Nˆ2; 1) ∈ (0, 1) such that for team
member 1 the expected gain in direct project profits outweighs the expected reputation loss:21
Λ [α(Rˆ1, Nˆ2; 1) pN − α(Rˆ1, Rˆ2; 1) p]pi > Λ
2 (1−λ)
1−Λ2 ∆ k,
⇔ α(Rˆ1, Nˆ2; 1) > αIR + α(Rˆ1, Rˆ2; 1) ppN , (32)
where
αIR ≡ Λ (1− λ)
1− Λ2
∆ k
pN pi
. (33)
However, since transfers among team members must balance ex post, sabotage cannot be
prevented by reallocating profit shares if αIR ≥ 1, which is equivalent to pi ≤ Λ (1−λ)
(1−Λ2) pN ∆ k.
Then the possible reputation loss exceeds the benefits from project success. This already
provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a sabotage equilibrium. Even if αIR < 1,
a contract that induces cooperation may still not be profitable at the contracting stage. The
team must also worry that setting contract terms to satisfy inequality (32) may induce an agent
with a novel idea to refrain from implementing it or even engage in sabotage. For example,
if α(Rˆ1, Nˆ2; 1) is large then worker 2 might find it profitable to reduce the success probability
by not innovating and thus guaranteeing herself a better share of profits of 1 − α(Nˆ1, Rˆ2; 1)
or 1− α(Rˆ1, Rˆ2; 1). Should worker 2 anticipate that she will not implement an innovation at
the interim stage, she has clearly no incentives to engage in effort herself. Therefore, even if a
contract induces cooperation at the interim stage, it may not satisfy both workers’ incentive
constraints for effort at the previous stage.
As before, the maximum value of the cost parameter c for which a sabotage equilibrium may
exist can be found by setting α(Nˆ1, Nˆ2; 1) = α(Rˆ1, Rˆ2; 1) = 1/2. The final step of verifying
that a contract inducing high-effort will indeed be chosen is relegated to the appendix, and we
directly state the following result:
21The case for player 2 is symmetric, setting α(Nˆ1, Rˆ2; 1) = 1− α(Rˆ1, Nˆ2; 1).
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Lemma 7
Under the IR-regime,
c ≤ cIR(+,S) ≡ ηΛ (pNN − p)pi/2 + cIR0 ,
is a necessary condition and
αIR ≡ Λ (1− λ)
1− Λ2
∆ k
pN pi
≥ 1.
is a sufficient condition for high-effort equilibria with sabotage to exist.
Cooperative high-effort equilibria
Now suppose that the market believes that talented workers innovate and there is no sabotage.
Hence, each worker who produces new ideas can realize her novel approach. Since both team
mates’ idea generating processes are independent, a worker’s second period wage only depends
on her own realized approach. Thus, following an innovation a worker reveals her talent and
bi(Nˆi, ·; ·) = k¯, i = 1, 2. If a worker fails to implement a novel approach she might be of
average ability or talented and unlucky in the search for innovative ideas, leading to second
period wage:
bi(Rˆi, ·; ·) = k + λ− Λ1− Λ ∆ k. (34)
As in Section 3.3, a worker who is capable of implementing a novel approach would reduce her
second period wage by deviating from the equilibrium strategy to sabotage. Any deviation
to sabotage by a worker who failed to innovate would strictly lower the success probability
of the project. In contrast to Section 3.3, the project outcome now matters because of the
material benefit pi that the team mates share. Thus, a contract α(·, ·; ·) = 1/2 ensures that
a worker i strictly prefers to cooperate regardless of her innovation success and that workers’
effort incentives are maximized. In the proof of the following result we show that, given the
above beliefs, such a contract indeed will be chosen at the contracting stage.
Lemma 8
Under information regime IR, cooperative high-effort equilibria exist if and only if
c ≤ cIR(+,C) ≡ η [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p)]
pi
2
+ 2 cTR0 . (35)
In Section 3, we showed that absent direct material payoffs from production individual records
always induce sabotage. With such material payoffs sabotage becomes more costly for a
worker because she forfeits potential material gains by lowering the chances of a successful
project outcome. Moreover, the possibility to write a contract that allocates these gains
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depending on the individual contributions to the project helps avoid sabotage. Nevertheless,
if potential reputational gains from signal jamming are sufficiently large, high-effort equilibria
with sabotage can still arise. Additionally, there now exist cooperative high-effort equilibria,
in which innovations are always implemented.
4.4 Comparison of information regimes
The above results and the comparisons in Proposition 1 lead to the following result:
Proposition 2
With material benefits pi > 0, the range of parameter values for which a high-effort equilibrium
exists is monotonic in the degree of transparency. Nevertheless, increasing transparency from
the TR- to the IR-regime can induce a less productive high-effort equilibrium with sabotage:
cTR+ > c
PR
+ and c
IR
(+,C) > c
TR
+ > c
IR
(+,S).
With material benefits, the range of parameter values for which cooperative high-effort equi-
libria exist increases with the degree of transparency. An increase in transparency by moving
from the PR- to the TR-regime unambiguously enhances incentives. However, switching from
the TR to the IR-regime can either enhance or decrease incentives, depending on which equi-
librium realizes under the IR-regime. On the one hand, individual records permit workers to
receive rewards for their individual contributions and thus potentially alleviate the free riding
problem. On the other hand, individual accountability can also induce sabotage. As in Section
3, this signal jamming leads to a better reputation for a worker who fails to innovate if she
is part of a team which has a profile of routine approaches than if the team mate realizes
an innovative approach. Since under the IR-regime high-effort equilibria with cooperation or
sabotage may arise, greater transparency is not always better for incentives even with material
benefits. In fact, as Section 8.1 demonstrates, under the IR-regime, cooperative high-effort
equilibria are less stable than sabotage equilibria.
5 Welfare implications
The preceding discussion focused on the strength of incentives under the different information
regimes. To derive the implications for welfare, we first determine the efficient effort levels for
a given cost parameter c (see appendix):
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Lemma 9
Regardless of the information regime, it is efficient that
• all workers exert effort if talented if and only if c ≤ min [c1100, c1110] , where
c1100 ≡ η [ Λ (pNN − pN ) + (2− Λ)(pN − p)] pi/2,
c1110 ≡ η [ Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ)(pN − p)] pi;
• only one worker exerts effort if talented if and only if c1110 < c ≤ c1000, where
c1000 ≡ η (pN − p)pi;
• no effort effort is exerted otherwise.
Consider first the efficiency of effort decisions for a given degree of transparency. Under any
information regime, effort incentives may be inefficiently low if reputational incentives are
sufficiently low. As shown in the previous section, effort incentives are maximal under the
IR-regime with cooperation. Nevertheless, high-effort equilibria may not exist even though
high-effort is efficient, e.g. if cIR(+,C) < c ≤ min
[
c1100, c
11
10
]
.22 Thus, if workers are mainly
motivated by the material benefit pi derived from the team output, free riding among team
member can kill off incentives. This corresponds to the logic underlying the classical model
of Holmstro¨m (1982), which studies the limiting case ∆ k = 0. In contrast, if career concerns
are sufficiently strong, effort incentives can be inefficiently large. This is seen most easily for
the case when there are no material benefits (pi = 0). Here, any effort is wasteful but for
some range of values of the cost parameter c, high-effort equilibria exist under any information
regime.
What are the implications of more transparency for efficiency? The preceding discussion
showed that, because of career concerns, increasing effort incentives is not always efficient, and
therefore welfare does not necessarily increase with more transparency. Consider again the case
pi = 0 in which any effort is wasteful and parameter values for which max
[
cPR0 , c
IR
0
]
< c ≤ cTR0 .
Then, moving to the TR-regime, for which a high-effort equilibrium without sabotage exists, in-
creases effort incentives but clearly decreases welfare. In this example, welfare is non-monotonic
in the degree of transparency, decreasing when moving from the least transparent information
regime, PR, to the more transparent TR-regime, and increasing again when moving to the
most transparent information regime, IR. However, incentives and welfare can also be aligned
22This situation may arise since cIR(+,C) = 2 c
TR
0 +c
11
00−η(pN−p)pi/2 = 2 cTR0 +c1110/2 and cTR0 → 0 as ∆ k → 0.
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as the following example for the situation with pi > 0 shows. High effort is efficient whenever
c ≤ min [c1100, c1110]. This condition implies that
min {(pN − p), (Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p))} 1− λ1− Λ ≥
∆ k
pi
, (36)
and, therefore, is more likely to be satisfied when the heterogeneity of experienced workers’
productivities, ∆ k, is low. Now, if high effort is efficient and cPR+ < c
TR
+ < c ≤ cIR(+,C) then
both effort incentives and welfare increase with the added transparency of the IR-regime if
cooperation ensues. The following result summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 3
For a given information regime, effort incentives are inefficiently low (high) if ∆ k is relatively
small (large). Moreover, welfare can either increase or decrease with transparency and does
not necessarily move in the same direction as effort incentives.
One should be careful to point out that the above analysis neglects potential other sources of
welfare gains. First, it may be that the material benefit of the project outcome for the team
members, pi, is less than the social value of the project outcome. One example is that the
project is a public good that creates additional social welfareW in case of success. Thus,W+pi
matters for the efficiency of effort, while effort incentives are influenced by pi only. A second
possibility is that the development of new ideas per se improves the efficiency of production
for other teams through technological spill-overs. A third reason could be that innovations
provide signals that improve sorting in the second period. The next section explores this last
possibility.
6 Reputation based job assignments
This section illustrates the additional welfare implications that may arise from reputation based
job assignments in the labor market. It also demonstrates that our main insights do not rely
on the assumption of asymmetric learning about ability. To this end we drop the assumption
that a worker learns her ability parameter θ. This corresponds to the classical Holmstro¨m
(1999) context, in which information about talent is symmetric (symmetric learning).23
For simplicity, consider a situation in which pi = 0 (i.e., effort is purely wasteful) but in which
there are gains from improved sorting of experienced workers. We introduce these gains by
23What would happen if we made this assumption in the base model with pi = 0? There, second period wages
are linear in expected talent. If workers take the effort decision without knowing their type, the martingale
property of Bayesian beliefs implies that the reputational payoffs offset each other and there are no effort
incentives at all (cf. also Lemma 1).
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Figure 1: Jobs for experienced workers
allowing for various types of jobs for experienced workers with different sensitivities to human
capital. Specifically, in period 2, firms can place a worker in one of three different types of jobs
J = 1, 2, 3. Assigned to job J , a worker of normal ability θ produces q
J
and a worker of high
ability θ¯ produces q¯J ≡ qJ +∆ qJ (where ∆ qJ > 0). Figure 1 graphs expected productivity as
a function of expected ability. A worker who is expected to be of low ability (E[θ|m(R)] < T1])
should be assigned to job 1, a worker of intermediate ability (T1 ≤ E[θ|m(R)] < T2]) to job 2,
and a worker of high ability (E[θ|m(R)] ≥ T2]) to job 3.24
We will focus on the parameter constellations where T1 > θ + λ∆ θ and T2 > θ +
1
2
(
1 + λ−Λ1−Λ
)
∆ θ. Then, it is straightforward to show that the possible high-effort equilib-
ria under the different information regimes have the same structure as in Section 2. Faced
with the prior distribution of talent it is efficient to assign a worker to job 1. The threshold
for assignment to job 3 requires that Pr(θi = θ¯ |m(R)) > Pr(θi = θ¯ | Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) = 12
(
1 + λ−Λ1−Λ
)
.
Hence, job assignments as a function of the profile of realized approaches and the project
outcome are as in Table 1. Under the regimes PR and TR high-effort equilibria exist (and
always involve cooperation) if c is smaller than the respective threshold cPRsym or c
TR
sym given in
the appendix. For the IR-regime high-effort equilibria exist (and always involve sabotage) if
c ≤ cIRsym.
As a benchmark, we consider the full information case where effort and the idea generating
process are publicly observable. Then, effort is efficient if the signal provided by innovations
improves job assignment sufficiently to outweigh its cost. If no effort is implemented, only the
24This is similar to the setups in Waldman (1984), Bernhardt (1995), and Gibbons and Waldman (1999). For
example, this reduced form could result from increasing returns to talent in different levels of a hierarchy (see
Rosen (1982)).
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job information regime
assignment PR TR IR
1 y˜ = 0 (Rˆ, Rˆ) Rˆi
2 y˜ = 1 (Rˆ, Nˆ) –
3 – (Nˆ , Nˆ) Nˆi
Table 1: Job assignments
Parameter values
λ = 1/2 η = 1/2 pNN = 1 pN = 1/2 p = 1/4
Job J 1 2 3
q
J
6 5 0
q¯J 7 9 15
Cost thresholds for the efficiency
of high-effort equilibria
first best cPRsym c
TR
sym c
IR
sym
2 0.08 0.71 0.53
Welfare from high effort (c = 0)
first full
best info cPRsym c
TR
sym c
IR
sym
16.5 14.51 12.66 13.88 13.5
Table 2: Numerical example
prior distribution of talent is known and a worker will always be assigned to job 1. If effort is
implemented a worker who succeeds in discovering a novel approach (Ii = 1) will be assigned
to job 3 and otherwise will be assigned to job 1. Thus, it is efficient to have both agents exert
effort if and only if c ≤ Λ (q¯3 − q¯1).
Equipped with the above results, we illustrate the potential welfare implications arising from
reputation based job assignments using the numerical example given in Table 2. High effort is
efficient if c is less than 2. As in the base model, the threshold values for c, below which high-
effort equilibria exist, vary non-monotonically in the degree of transparency. However, even if
c is such that high effort arises under any regime (e.g., c = 0), welfare is affected through the
efficiency of job assignments. Moving from the PR to the TR-regime improves job assignments
because it becomes possible to perfectly identify an individual’s ideas if both team mates have
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the same outcome of the idea generating process. Still, more transparency could be beneficial
since then ideas could be individually attributed even in the mixed outcome case leading to
realized profile (Rˆ, Nˆ) under the TR-regime. In the full information outcome, instead of being
assigned job 2, the worker with Rˆ (Nˆ) is moved to job 1 (3), leading to a welfare gain of
2Λ (1 − Λ)
[
q¯3 − q¯2 + q1 − q2
]
= 0.63. However, because a high-effort equilibrium under the
IR-regime always involves sabotage, in the mixed outcome case the realized profile under the
IR-regime would be (Rˆ, Rˆ) and both workers would be assigned to job 1. Thus, a move from
the TR- to the IR- regime entails a drop in welfare of 2Λ (1 − Λ)
[
q¯1 − q¯2 + q1 − q2
]
= 0.38.
Thus, even though more transparency could improve job assignments, sabotage leads to a
welfare loss when moving from the TR to the IR regime.
7 Team with a budget balancing principal
In the base model with self-governed teams more transparency can hurt incentives. Does this
carry over to team production in firms as well? Human resource managers often argue that
compensation based on individual performance rather than group performance reduces worker
morale and creates conflict. We will now explore this proposition in our setup.
One reason why the presence of a principal could change the picture is that the principal can
serve as a budget balancer, eliminating the limited liability restriction of the base model.25
Self-governed teams have some scope to prevent sabotage in the IR-regime by allocating
an unsuccessful individual with a larger share of the material benefit to compensate for the
reputation loss associated with being the only one to have failed to innovate (see Section 4.3).
However, the restriction that transfers among team members must balance ex post means
that sabotage cannot be prevented in situations where the possible reputation loss exceeds the
material benefits that can be distributed in case of project success.
Consider now the situation where team members are agents for a principal to whom project
benefits y˜ pi accrue and who is not constrained to balancing the budget ex post. Assume that
the principal can choose the information regime and that the market observes this choice and
the contract offered to the team members. As before, parties are restricted to spot contracts.
Thus, the principal can only offer incentive schemes that condition wages on the observable
outcome of the team production. If the principal wanted to implement effort, and had to
choose between the TR-regime and an IR-regime that always induces sabotage, the TR-regime
would always be preferred: under such an IR-regime reputational incentives are smaller and
25In the standard team setting of Holmstro¨m (1982) such a budget balancing principal can restore efficient
incentives.
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the project success probability lower than under the TR-regime. However, the principal can
set transfers in such a way that cooperation is always guaranteed under the IR-regime, thus
influencing market beliefs to sustain this outcome. What remains to be shown is under what
conditions the principal might prefer the TR-regime to the more transparent IR regime if
cooperation is induced through appropriately designed contracts.
Suppose that the market holds the belief that under the IR-regime sabotage arises unless the
contract stipulates that an agent i who is not successful is fully compensated for the repu-
tation loss associated with cooperation through a wage payment wIRi (Rˆi, Nˆj) =
Λ2 (1−λ)
1−Λ2 ∆ k.
In addition, to induce effort by talented workers the principal’s contract needs to satisfy
the effort incentive constraint. Because agents are risk-neutral it is without loss of gen-
erality to concentrate possible additional wage payments in the outcome state (Nˆi, Nˆj) by
setting wIRi (Nˆi, Nˆj) = max
[
c−2 cTR0
Λ η ∆ k, 0
]
. Hence, the expected cost of implementing effort
and cooperation under the IR-regime is 2Λ2wIRi (Nˆi, Nˆj) + 2Λ (1 − Λ)wIRi (Rˆi, Nˆj). In con-
trast, under the TR-regime cooperation is always guaranteed and the principal needs to offer
wTRi (Nˆ , Nˆ) = max
[
c−cTR0
Λ η ∆ k, 0
]
to induce effort.
It is useful to distinguish the following three cases:
1. If c ≥ 2 cTR0 , monetary incentives are needed under both information regimes to induce
effort. The difference in profits for the principal then becomes26
ΠTR −ΠIR = 2Λ (1− Λ)wIRi (Rˆi, Nˆj) + 2Λ2
[
wIRi (Nˆi, Nˆj)− wTRi (Nˆ , Nˆ)
]
=
Λ(1− λ)
1− Λ2
[
2Λ2(1− Λ)− (1 + Λ)] ∆ k < 0. (37)
In this situation the principal always prefers the more transparent IR-regime.
2. If cTR0 < c < 2 c
TR
0 , monetary incentives are needed under the TR-regime to induce effort
while under the IR-regime monetary payments wIRi (Rˆi, Nˆj) are only required to sustain
cooperation. Then,
ΠTR −ΠIR = 2Λ (1− Λ)wIRi (Rˆi, Nˆj)− 2Λ2wTRi (Nˆ , Nˆ)
=
2Λ
η
[ (1− λ) η [1 + Λ + 2Λ2 (1− Λ)]
2(1− Λ2) ∆ k︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡c˜
−c
]
. (38)
It is straightforward to show that cTR0 < c˜ < 2 c
TR
0 . Thus, the less transparent TR-regime
is more profitable if cTR0 < c < c˜.
26Note that Λ ≤ 1/2 and thus 2Λ2(1− Λ) ≤ 1/4.
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3. Finally, if c ≤ cTR0 the TR-regime is always optimal: it guarantees cooperation and
requires no monetary transfers since career concerns provide sufficient effort incentives,
whereas monetary transfers wIRi (Rˆi, Nˆj) are still necessary under the IR-regime to sus-
tain cooperation.
This yields the following result:
Proposition 4
Suppose that the market holds the belief that under the IR-regime sabotage arises unless the
team’s contract includes wages wIRi (Rˆi, Nˆj) =
Λ2 (1−λ)
1−Λ2 ∆ k, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Then a principal
strictly prefers the less transparent TR-regime over the IR-regime if and only if
c < c˜ ≡ (1− λ) η
[
1 + Λ + 2Λ2 (1− Λ)]
2(1− Λ2) ∆ k.
A corollary of this result is that, for c < c˜ the equilibrium monetary compensation is identical
for all team members since the principal cannot discriminate agents’ contributions under the
TR-regime. In other words, a principal might strictly prefer to implement group incentives
instead of individual ones, even though this contract form performs less well when one focuses
only on the direct monetary incentives. Key for this result is the fact that a compensation
scheme may adversely affect reputational incentives because of the information that it makes
available.27 Pay equity emerges because incentive schemes based on individual performance
provide signals to the market that are vulnerable to manipulation by disruptive behavior of
team members. This corresponds to the widespread notion that incentive contracts based on
each individual’s performance separately might reduce worker morale and create conflict in
teams because of resulting pay inequality. For example, Levine (1991) suggests that wage dis-
persion reduces productivity because it lowers group cohesiveness. Moreover, there is evidence
that relative pay affects job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald 1996). However, in contrast to the
existing literature, in our model sabotage is not a direct consequence of perceived inequalities
in pay but rather due to the informational externality that an agent can impose on the team.
Because of reputational incentives from team members’ career concerns the explicit incentive
scheme can be rather low-powered. The possibility of information-induced sabotage that we
highlight offers an additional element for explaining the increasing popularity of low-powered
group incentives (e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw (2003)).
27Koch and Peyrache (2003, 2005) show that a similar trade-off between ’good’ monetary incentives and
reputational incentives can emerge in a different setup as well.
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8 Other extensions of the base model
8.1 Exogenous sources of conflict
In this section, we demonstrate that, under the IR-regime, high-effort equilibria with cooper-
ation are more fragile than those with sabotage. Consider the following modification of the
base model. The realization of novel approaches is only feasible within an harmonious team
relationship, which requires both mutual compatibility of team members and their willingness
to cooperate. Conflict arises if team members are not compatible, which occurs with probabil-
ity x, regardless of the workers’ actions, or if at least one of the workers engages in sabotage.
We proceed to show that, under these assumptions, high-effort equilibria may always involve
sabotage under the IR-regime, while cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome
with performance and team records.
Performance and Team Record. Consider first the PR-regime. The logic from the base
model remains intact: given previous effort, cooperation is an equilibrium outcome since b(1) >
b(0) (as can easily be shown). Hence, it is optimal for talented workers to exert effort if effort
costs are not too high.
Under the TR-regime the realization of at least one novel approach indicates the absence
of conflict. Thus, in the candidate high-effort equilibrium with cooperation, b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) and
b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) are as in the base model. When no innovations are realized, firms cannot be sure
whether this is due to lack of talent/luck or lack of compatibility of team members, i.e.,
b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·) = k + xλ+ (1− x)(λ− Λ)(1− Λ)
x+ (1− x)(1− Λ)2 ∆ k. (39)
Note that the possibility of conflict for exogenous reasons increases the market’s evaluation
compared to the base model (where x = 0). However, given that workers exert effort, coop-
eration is still optimal since b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) > b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) > b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·). Hence, both the material and
the reputational gains are increasing in implemented innovations and the cooperative outcome
obtains. It is straightforward to show that sabotage cannot arise with either PR or TR
Individual Records. As in the base model, realizing a novel approach signals talent:
bi(Nˆi, ·) = k¯. What is different now are the beliefs about a worker i who fails to innovate.
Suppose first that the market’s beliefs are that workers exert effort if talented and do not
sabotage each other. If both workers fail to realize innovations, possible causes are lack of
talent/luck or conflict arising from incompatibility of team members, i.e.,
bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) = k + xλ+ (1− x)(λ− Λ)(1− Λ)
x+ (1− x)(1− Λ)2 ∆ k. (40)
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In contrast, the realization of at least one novel approach indicates the absence of conflict:
bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) = k + λ− Λ1− Λ ∆ k. (41)
This is worse news about worker i’s talent: bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; ·) < bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·). As in Section 4.3, to
prevent sabotage contract terms can be set to give a worker who fails to innovate a larger share
of the material benefit in case of success. A sufficient condition for this not to be feasible is
αˇC ≡ xΛ (1− λ)(1− Λ) [x+ (1− x)(1− Λ)2]
∆ k
pNpi
≥ 1. (42)
Following the steps of our analysis of the sabotage equilibrium in Section 4.3, we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 5
With exogenous sources of conflict, under the IR-regime all high-effort equilibria involve sab-
otage if the following sufficient conditions are met:
c ≤ η (1− x) Λ
[
(pNN − p) pi2 +
1− λ
x+ (1− x)(1− Λ2) ∆ k
]
and αˇC ≡ xΛ (1− λ)(1− Λ) [x+ (1− x)(1− Λ)2]
∆ k
pNpi
≥ 1.
It is straightforward to show that the implications of transparency for efficiency and effort
incentives are analogous to the ones in Section 4.
8.2 Limited observability of contributions
In some cases, it may be natural to assume that individual approaches can only be observed if
the project has been successful. For example, academic contributions are usually more visible
if they have been published in a widely disseminated journal (y˜ = 1). In this section, focus
again on the base case pi = 0 and assume that information regarding realized approaches
can potentially be observed – depending on the information regime – only if the project
has succeeded. In case of a project failure the market observes the signal y˜ = 0 under all
information regimes. As it turns out, this information structure only reinforces our main
insights.
Performance and Team Record. Again we consider candidate high-effort equilibria with-
out sabotage. Then, under any information regime, the observation y˜ = 0 induces market
beliefs b(0) derived in Section 3.1 (see equation (12)). Under the PR-regime project success
induces the same market beliefs b(1) as in Section 3.1 (see equation (9)). Hence, nothing
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changes relative to the base model: high-effort equilibria never involve sabotage and exist if
and only if c ≤ cPR0 . Under the TR-regime, project success and the observed team contribution
profile now induce the wages b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; 1), b(Nˆ , Rˆ; 1), and b(Rˆ, Rˆ; 1) from Section 3.2. Again, it
is straightforward to show that high-effort equilibria never involve sabotage and exist if and
only if
c ≤ cTRL ≡ η
{
Λ
[
pNN
(
b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; 1)− b(0)
)
+ pN
(
b(0)− b(Nˆ , Rˆ; 1)
)]
(43)
+ (1− Λ)
[
pN
(
b(Nˆ , Rˆ; 1)− b(0)
)
+ p
(
b(0)− b(Rˆ, Rˆ; 1)
)]}
.
Individual Records. As in the base model, cooperative high-effort equilibria do not exist.
To see this, consider a candidate high-effort equilibrium without sabotage. As under the other
information regimes, ensuing project failure the second period wage is b(0). In case of project
success, the market observes realized approaches and forms the following beliefs: bi(Nˆi, ·; 1) = k¯
and bi(Rˆi, ·; 1) = k+ λ−Λ1−Λ ∆k. It is easy to check that b(0) > bi(Rˆi, ·; 1). Therefore, given these
market beliefs, a player who fails in generating novel ideas will always engage in sabotage to
guarantee herself a wage of b(0). Note that this deviation from cooperation does not require
the tie-breaking assumption made in the base setup. To prove that high-effort equilibria with
sabotage exist, we proceed as in Section 3.3. In such a candidate equilibrium, following success
market beliefs on the equilibrium path are exactly as in the base model: bi(Nˆi, · ; 1) = k¯ and
bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; 1) = k+ λ−Λ
2
1−Λ2 ∆k. Off the equilibrium path (or introducing an arbitrarily small error
probability in the sabotage decision) we can again find a belief bmini (Rˆi, Nˆj ; 1) = k +
λ−Λ
1−Λ ∆k.
Project failure now induces market belief
bi,S(0) = k +
Λ2(1− pNN ) + (λ− Λ2)(1− p)
Λ2(1− pNN ) + (1− Λ2)(1− p) ∆k
> bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; 1) > bi(Rˆi, Nˆj ; 1). (44)
Therefore, an unsuccessful worker will always engage in sabotage. High-effort equilibria in-
volving sabotage exist whenever
c ≤ cIRL ≡ ηΛ
{
pNN
[
bi(Nˆi, Nˆj ; 1)− bi,S(0)
]
+ p
[
bi,S(0)− bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; 1)
]}
. (45)
As in the base model, cTRL > c
PR
0 and c
TR
L > c
IR
L , providing a corollary to Proposition 1.
8.3 Asymmetric priors
Often a team member will have a better or worse prior reputation than the other one, i.e.,
λ1 6= λ2. Possibly, because this individual is older and there is more information available
for the market to form a prior. Following the same steps as in Sections 3.1 to 3.3, we obtain
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again the result that all high-effort equilibria under regimes PR and TR are cooperative,
whereas they always involve sabotage under the IR-regime. A high-effort equilibrium under
the information regimeR ∈ {PR, TR} exists if and only if c ≤ min[cR1,A, cR2,A], for the thresholds
given in the appendix.
9 Conclusion
Free riding is a pervasive problem in team production when there is no budget balancing prin-
cipal (Holmstro¨m 1982). Therefore, it is puzzling that many real-life team settings involve
limited disclosure of individual contributions despite negligible costs for doing so. We provide
a rationale for this by showing that creating more individual accountability through greater
transparency about individuals’ contributions to team production does not necessarily im-
prove incentives. In the presence of strong career concerns the possibility of a non-monotonic
relationship between transparency and effort incentives arises.
In our team setting, information on the quality of individual inputs always improves incentives
while sustaining a cooperative team spirit. In contrast, making the identity of individual
contributors observable as well may induce sabotage behavior that looks like jealousy but
arises purely from signal jamming by less successful team members. Put simply, this means
that in the presence of career concerns too much information may ’hurt’ incentives. This
argument is robust to a number of different modelling choices, such as the inclusion of direct
material benefits and the possibility of contingent contracts among team members.
The welfare implications of increased transparency are ambiguous. It is shown that reputa-
tional incentives may be inefficiently strong. Stronger incentives tend to be welfare enhancing
when the social value generated by project success is large or if the information generated about
team members’ abilities during the first period production process leads to significant gains
from improved future job assignments. In these latter cases, welfare can be non-monotonic in
the degree of transparency as well.
In our setup sabotage emerges because of the informational externality that an agent can
impose on the team when information about individual contributions is made available for
the purpose of compensation. This is consistent with the notion that incentive contracts
based explicitly on individuals’ performances might reduce worker morale and create conflict
in teams. This interpretation is supported by the principal-agent version of the model, where
group incentives can be strictly more profitable than individual incentives. The result offers a
new explanation for the increasing popularity of such schemes.
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A Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the candidate equilibrium where sabotage occurs whenever a worker fails to gener-
ate novel ideas, with the corresponding market beliefs. On the equilibrium path beliefs are
b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) = k¯ and b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·) = k + λ−Λ2
1−Λ2 ∆ k. (see the derivation of equation (20)). Off the
equilibrium path, the only restriction on beliefs is that they are consistent with the production
technology. Upon observing realized approaches (Rˆ, Nˆ), it is clear that no sabotage occurred
and that at least one worker is talented. The worst belief consistent with the technology about
the other worker arises if the market assumes that she provided effort if she was talented and
failed to generate novel ideas:
bmin(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) = k + 1
2
[
1 +
λ− Λ
1− Λ
]
∆ k. (46)
Thus, if at least one novel approach is implemented, consistent beliefs lead to second period
wages greater or equal to bmin(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·). Since
bmin(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·)− b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·) = 1− λ
2 (1 + Λ)
> 0, (47)
it always pays off to deviate to cooperation, leading to a contradiction.
B Proof of Proposition 1
cTR0 − cPR0
∆ k
=
η (1− λ)
2 (1− Λ) −
ηΛ (1− λ)
[
Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p)
]2
Λ2 pNN + 2Λ (1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p
=
(1− λ) η
DEN
{
(1− Λ)2 p [Λ2 [2 (pNN − pN ) + 1− pN ] + (1− Λ2) (1− p)]
+2Λ (1− Λ) pN [2 Λ (1− Λ) (1− pNN ) + (1− 2Λ (1− Λ)) (1− pN )] (48)
+ 2Λ3 (1− Λ) pNN (1− pNN ) + Λ2 (1− Λ)2 (pNN − p pN )
}
> 0,
DEN = 2 (1− Λ) [Λ2 pNN + 2Λ (1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p] . (49)
C Proof of Lemma 5
Given market beliefs b(1) and b(0) of a high-effort equilibrium, the ex ante expected team
utilities for the situations where all talented workers exert effort (V PR11 ), only one worker
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i = 1, 2 exerts effort if talented (V PR10 ), or no worker exerts effort (V
PR
00 ) are:
V PR11 =
[
Λ2 pNN + 2Λ (1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p
]
(pi + 2 b(1)) (50)
+
[
Λ2 (1− pNN ) + 2Λ (1− Λ) (1− pN ) + (1− Λ)2 (1− p)
]
2 b(0)− 2λ c,
V PR10 = [Λ pN + (1− Λ) p] (pi + 2 b(1)) (51)
+ [Λ (1− pN ) + (1− Λ) (1− p)] 2 b(0)− λ c,
V PR00 = p (pi + 2 b(1)) + (1− p) 2 b(0). (52)
V PR11 − V PR10 = Λ [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p)] [pi + 2 (b(1)− b(0))]− λ c
= λ
(
2 cPR+ − c
)
, (53)
V PR11 − V PR00 = Λ [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (2− Λ) (pN − p)] [pi + 2 (b(1)− b(0))]− 2λ c
> 2λ
(
cPR+ − c
)
. (54)
If c ≤ cPR+ ex ante team utility is maximized with a contract that implements high effort.
D Proof of Lemma 6
Given market beliefs b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·), b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·), and b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·) of a high-effort equilibrium, the ex
ante expected team utilities for the situations where all talented workers exert effort (V TR11 ),
only one worker i = 1, 2 exerts effort if talented (V TR10 ), or no worker exerts effort (V
TR
00 ) are:
V TR11 =
[
Λ2 pNN + 2Λ (1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p
]
pi (55)
+2Λ2 b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) + 4Λ (1− Λ) b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) + 2 (1− Λ)2 b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)− 2λ c,
V TR10 = [Λ pN + (1− Λ) p] pi + 2Λ b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·) + 2 (1− Λ) b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)− λ c, (56)
V TR00 = p pi + 2 b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·). (57)
V TR11 − V TR10 = Λ [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ) (pN − p)] pi
+ 2Λ
[
Λ b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) + (1− 2Λ) b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·)− (1− Λ) b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)
]
− λ c
= λ
(
2 cTR+ − c
)
, (58)
V TR11 − V TR00 = Λ [Λ (pNN − pN ) + (2− Λ) (pN − p)] pi
+ 2Λ
[
Λ b(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) + 2(1− Λ) b(Rˆ, Nˆ ; ·)− (2− Λ) b(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)
]
− 2λ c
> 2λ
(
cTR+ − c
)
. (59)
If c ≤ cTR+ ex ante team utility is maximized with a contract that implements high effort.
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E Proof of Lemma 7
For the case in which sabotage cannot be contractually excluded, we again need to verify that a
contract inducing high effort with sabotage maximizes expected team utility at the contracting
stage.
V
(IR,S)
11 =
[
Λ2 pNN + (1− Λ2) p
]
pi + 2Λ2 bi(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·) + (1− Λ2) bi(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)− 2λ c,
V
(IR,S)
10 = V
(IR,S)
00 − λ c, (60)
V
(IR,S)
00 = p pi + 2 bi(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·). (61)
V
(IR,S)
11 − V (IR,S)10 > V (IR,S)11 − V (IR,S)00
= Λ2
[
(pNN − pN )pi + 2
(
bi(Nˆ , Nˆ ; ·)− bi(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·)
)]
− 2λ c
= 2λ
(
cIR(+,S) − c
)
. (62)
F Proof of Lemma 8
Again we need to check that a contract inducing high effort with cooperation maximizes
expected team utility at the contracting stage.
V
(IR,C)
11 =
[
Λ2 pNN + 2Λ (1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p
]
pi (63)
+2Λ2 bi(Nˆ , ·; ·) + 2Λ (1− Λ)
[
bi(Nˆ , ·; ·) + bi(Rˆ, ·; ·)
]
+ 2 (1− Λ) bi(Rˆ, ·; ·)− 2λ c,
V
(IR,C)
10 = [Λ pN + (1− Λ) p]
+Λ
[
bi(Nˆ , ·; ·) + bi(Rˆ, ·; ·)
]
+ 2 (1− Λ) bi(Rˆ, ·; ·)− λ c, (64)
V
(IR,C)
00 = p pi + 2 bi(Rˆ, Rˆ; ·). (65)
V
(IR,C)
11 − V (IR,C)00 = λ
(
2 cIR(+,C) − c
)
, (66)
V
(IR,C)
11 − V (IR,C)00 < V (IR,S)11 − V (IR,S)00 , (67)
since V (IR,C)11 > V
(IR,S)
11 and V
(IR,C)
00 < V
(IR,S)
00 .
G Proof of Lemma 9
From an ex ante perspective, both workers exerting effort if talented is better than no effort
provision if and only if[
Λ2 pNN + 2Λ (1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p
]
pi − 2λ c ≥ p pi
⇔ c ≤ c1100 ≡ η [ Λ (pNN − pN ) + (2− Λ)(pN − p)] pi/2. (68)
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Both workers exerting effort if talented is better than only worker i exerting effort if talented
and the other worker j never exerting effort if and only if
[
Λ2 pNN + 2Λ (1− Λ) pN + (1− Λ)2 p
]
pi − 2λ c ≥ [Λ pN + (1− Λ) p] pi − λ c
⇔ c ≤ c1110 ≡ η [ Λ (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ)(pN − p)] pi. (69)
Only worker i exerting effort if talented and the other worker j never exerting effort is better
than no effort provision if and only if
[Λ pN + (1− Λ) p] pi − λ c ≥ p pi ⇔ c ≤ c1000 ≡ η (pN − p)pi. (70)
H Thresholds cPRsym, c
TR
sym, and c
IR
sym
The expressions for NUM and Pr(1) are given in Section 3.1.
cPRsym ≡ Λ [Λ(pNN − pN ) + (1− Λ)(pN − p)] (71)
×
[
q
2
+
NUM
Pr(1)
∆q2 −
(
q
1
+
λ−NUM
1− Pr(1) ∆q1
)]
,
cTRsym ≡ Λ2
[
q¯3 −
(
q
2
+
(
1 +
λ− Λ
1− Λ
)
∆q2
2
)]
(72)
+ Λ(1− Λ)
[
q
2
+
(
1 +
λ− Λ
1− Λ
)
∆q2
2
−
(
q
1
+
λ− Λ
1− Λ∆q1
)]
,
cIRsym ≡ Λ2
[
q¯3 −
(
q
1
+
λ− Λ2
1− Λ2∆q1
)]
. (73)
I Proof of Proposition 5
Given market beliefs that both workers exert effort and that sabotage occurs unless both
workers innovate, we have
bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) = k + λ− (1− x) Λ
2
1− (1− x) Λ2 ∆ k. (74)
As in Section 4 one needs to check that contracts cannot induce a profitable deviation to
cooperation. Following the same steps as there, we find the sufficient condition
αˇS ≡ Λ (1− λ) [1− (1− x) Λ](1− Λ) [1− (1− x) Λ2]
∆ k
pNpi
≥ 1. (75)
This is implied by αˇC ≥ 1 since
αˇS − αˇC = (1− x) Λ (1− λ) [1− Λ (2− (1− x) Λ)](1− Λ) [1− (1− x) Λ2] [x+ (1− x) (1− Λ)2]
∆ k
pNpi
> 0. (76)
37
Again, maximum incentives can be guaranteed with an equal split of profits on the equilibrium
path. The incentive constraint for a talented worker i becomes
(1− x) Λ η [k¯ + pNN2 pi]+ (1− (1− x) Λ η) [bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) + p2 pi]− c ≥ bi(Rˆi, Rˆj ; ·) + p2 pi
⇔ (1− x) Λ η
[
(pNN − p) pi2 + 1−λ1−(1−x) Λ2 ∆ k
]
≥ c. (77)
J Thresholds cPRi,A , c
TR
i,A , and c
IR
i,A for i=1,2
cPRi,A ≡
Λj (pNN − pN ) + (1− Λj) (pN − p)
2PrA(1) [1− PrA(1)] ×
{
Λ1 Λ2 η (2− λ1 − λ2)(pNN − p)
+ [Λ1 η (1− λ1)(1− Λ2) + Λ2 η (1− λ2)(1− Λ1)] (pN − p)
}
∆ k, (78)
PrA(1) = Λ1 Λ2 pNN + [Λ1 (1− Λ2) + (1− Λ1) Λ2] pN + (1− Λ1)(1− Λ2) p, (79)
cTRi,A ≡
Λj (1− η) (λ1 − λ2)2 + λ1 (1− λ1)(1− Λ2)2 + (1− Λ1)2 λ2 (1− λ2)
2 (1− Λ1)(1− Λ2) [λ1 (1− Λ2) + (1− Λ1)λ2] η∆ k,(80)
cIRi,A ≡
Λj η (1− λi)
1− Λ1 Λ2 ∆ k. (81)
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